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Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence

Name: Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence
Brand: Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. KG
SKU: 02108260
Price: 123.99 EUR
Availability: InStock
Author: William V. Gehrlein
ISBN: 9783642031069

The Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules

William V. Gehrlein

Dominique Lepelley

Language

English

Book Hardback

Libristo code: 02108260

Publishers Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. KG, November 2010

The likelihood of observing Condorcet's Paradox is known to be very low for elections with a small n... Full description

Libristo code: 02108260

303 b

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The likelihood of observing Condorcet's Paradox is known to be very low for elections with a small number of candidates if voters preferences on candidates reflect any significant degree of a number of different measures of mutual coherence. This reinforces the intuitive notion that strange election outcomes should become less likely as voters preferences become more mutually coherent. Similar analysis is used here to indicate that this notion is valid for most, but not all, other voting paradoxes. This study also focuses on the Condorcet Criterion, which states that the pairwise majority rule winner should be chosen as the election winner, if one exists. Representations for the Condorcet Efficiency of the most common voting rules are obtained here as a function of various measures of the degree of mutual coherence of voters preferences. An analysis of the Condorcet Efficiency representations that are obtained yields strong support for using Borda Rule.