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Within the context of a critique of volitional accounts of action based on trying, this volume articulates a conception of intentional action based on the notion of "de re" intention. A central theme is that volitional theories of action based on the concept of trying presuppose dubious Cartesian assumptions about the nature of mind and mental states. The book includes an original account of Cartesianism which seeks to capture how even the orthodox materialist theories of action are bound by Cartesian assumptions. Articulating criticisms of contemporary volitional theories against the backdrop of this Cartesian picture, the text provides a diagnosis of what the author sees as amiss in all these views and should motivate a new view of the mind and its role in intentional action.