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Contested Economic Institutions

Name: Contested Economic Institutions
Brand: Cambridge University Press
SKU: 02038833
Price: 104.09 EUR
Availability: InStock
Author: Torben Iversen
ISBN: 9780521642262

The Politics of Macroeconomics and Wage Bargaining in Advanced Democracies

Torben Iversen

Language

English

Book Hardback

Libristo code: 02038833

Publishers Cambridge University Press, August 1999

This book helps explain one of the most intriguing and politically salient puzzles in comparative po... Full description

Libristo code: 02038833

255 b

104.09 € VAT included

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This book helps explain one of the most intriguing and politically salient puzzles in comparative political economy: why some countries have much higher unemployment rates than others. Contrary to new classical economics the focus is on explaining distribution and equilibrium unemployment, and contrary to neo-corporatist theory the role of monetary policy and rational expectation is integral to the analysis. The book makes two central arguments. The first is that monetary policies affect equilibrium employment whenever wages are set above the firm level. The second argument focuses on the distributive effects of different institutions, and models institutional design as a strategic game between partisan governments and cross-class alliances of unions and employers.